Monday, September 30, 2019

Hayagreeva Rao, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

First Meeting: Overcoming Liabilities of Newness in Flash Teams; A Field Experiment

Time and Location: 3:00-4:30 PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford CA 94305 (Room 123)

Monday, October 7, 2019

Michelle Jackson, Sociology Department, Stanford University

The Construction of Educational Opportunity

Time and Location: 3:00-4:30PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)

This study calls into question the view that educational expansion has a causal effect on class-based inequalities of educational opportunity. This view arose because the institutions that are actually expanding and allocating educational slots – schools, colleges and universities – are treated as black boxes in conventional macro-level theories of expansion. If the black box is opened, we see that educational institutions at once make decisions about expansion and allocation, thus undermining a simplistic model that has expansion affecting allocation. I argue that the field must develop new measures of educational supply in order to identify the true relationship between educational expansion and inequality of educational opportunity. I draw upon empirical examples from college education in the United States to illustrate the argument.

Monday, October 14, 2019

Amanda Sharkey, Booth School of Business, The University of Chicago

Risky Business: Status and Pricing in the Market for Audit Services

Time and Location: 3:00-4:00PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)

According to Podolny (1993), lower costs are one of the most significant advantages that high-status firms enjoy. Although prior research provides some support for this argument, the evidence is largely indirect. In order to advance understanding of the relationship between a firm’s status and the price that it is charged for goods and services, we analyze pricing behavior in the $60 billion U.S. market for audit services. Contrary to the predictions of existing theory, we find that audit firms systematically charge their clients more as a function of their status, even after controlling for the complexity and riskiness of the audit. We explore a variety of possible explanations for this surprising finding, including the conjecture that auditors charge firms for the disproportionate attention that high-status firms tend to garner in cases where problems arise and the idea that higher-status firms might be more willing to pay higher prices in order to signal the quality of their financial reports. 




Monday, October 21, 2019

Robert Eberhert, Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University

Time and Location: 3:00-4:00PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)

Monday, October 28, 2019

Jesper Strandgaard, Copenhagen Business School

Time and Location: 3:00-4:30PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)

Monday, November 4, 2019

Mike Kirst and W. Richard Scott, Graduate School of Education & Sociology Department, Stanford University

Time and Location: 3:00-4:30PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)

Monday, November 11, 2019

Julie Posselt, Rossier School of Education, University of Southern California

Time and Location: 3:00-4:30PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)

Monday, November 18, 2019

Michael Borjesson, Department of Education, Uppsala University

Time and Location: 3:00-4:30PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)

Monday, December 2, 2019

Marc Ventresca, Saïd Business School, University of Oxford

Time and Location: 3:00-4:30PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)

Monday, December 9, 2019

Ben Domingue, Graduate School of Education, Stanford University

Time and Location: 3:00-4:30PM, CERAS Building, 520 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305 (Room 123)